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A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR FRIED'S
ANATOMY OF VALUES*
Robert S. Summerst
Charles Fried, Professor of Law at Harvard University, has recently
published what is probably the only philosophical essay' on value
theory ever written by an American law teacher.2 Fried may also be the
first American legal philosopher to write about love, friendship, and
life plans. His work is striking in a further respect: He is actually a
system builder, with a penchant for subsumesmanship. The world of
human values (which he purports to discover rather than to build)
turns out to have a remarkably systematic structure. Insofar as two
prominent Harvard colleagues, philosopher John Rawls3 and sociologist
Talcott Parsons,4 help him "discover" features of this world, he subsumes their views within his system.
Various activities qualify as value theory. 5 It is therefore appropriate to ascertain in what sense Fried's work is an essay in the subject.
He is not mainly interested in evaluating the goodness or badness of
the values men hold, and he does not offer any general justificatory
theories of value. 6 Nor is he mainly interested in the logic of value reasoning,7 nor in elucidating the meaning of key concepts in value theory
such as "good" and "value judgment."" And his is not a work on moral
theory as such. What, then, interests Fried? Insofar as any one factor
can be singled out, it seems to be a belief that human beings would be
* Copyright @ 1971 by Robert S. Summers. All rights reserved.

t Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.S. 1955, University of Oregon; LL.B. 1959,
Harvard University.
1 C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY

OF VALUEs-PROBLEMS

OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE

(1970) [hereinafter cited as FRuE]. The present article began merely as a brief review, but
it soon became apparent that a more comprehensive critique was in order.
2 Fried is both full-time and full-fledged. Moreover, Fried did a great deal of work
with full-time professional philosophers in the course of developing the manuscript for
this book. Id. at vii-viii.
3 Most of chapter four is devoted to summarizing Rawls's "system" of morality and
justice. Rawls's book on justice is soon to appear.
4 Most of chapter seven is devoted to summarizing aspects of Parsons's social "system."
5 Lawyers will find Professor William K. Frankena's summary of the topics within
the field a useful way into the subject. See Frankena, Value and Valuation, in 8 P. EDWARDS, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHLosoPHY 229-82 (1967).

6 For a helpful work in this vein, see P. TAYLOR, NOtMATvE DISCOURs (1961).
7 An illustrative and useful work of this sort is A. Ross, DiucrivEs AN NORMs (1968)
(see especially ch. VI).
8 See, e.g., W. LAMoNT, THE VALUE JUDGMENT (1955).
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better off if -they acquired a "deeper understanding" of the world of
values and then chose and planned accordingly. 9 Human beings may acquire this deeper understanding mainly through "analyses" of the
"anatomies" of particular values-particular ends men do or might
pursue. Fried offers illustrations of particular analyses in his essay. 10
But he obviously cannot offer many analyses within 265 pages. It would
seem, then, that his main task should be that of developing a general
procedure for bringing off such analyses successfully, a procedure that
others might be able to make use of entirely on their own in contexts
beyond those he considers illustratively. 11
.
But not just any general analytical procedure can be automatically
applicable to just any subject matter. And it would be a telling
criticism of a procedure if it should prove irrelevant or inappropriate
to its subject matter. To escape such criticism, a general procedure for
analyzing the anatomy of particular values would have to be relevant
and appropriate-it would have to "accord with" the world of values.
Because Fried's general views on the nature of this world are thus
"logically prior" to any general analytical procedure he might recommend, we open with a consideration of them.
I
FRmr's WORLD OF VALUES' 2
Fried wants to help persons who hold or might hold particular
values- persons who pursue or might pursue particular ends. Indeed,
he frequently stresses that his essay is addressed to the "point of view"
of such persons.' 3 Fried thinks we all exist in a world that includes
a vast multiplicity of possible ends to be pursued, many of. which are
highly complex and all of which have a place within some "basic
category of value." Unfortunately, Fried does not present his general
picture of the world of values clearly and in one place. Rather, the
9 See especially the introduction, and chapters I, II, .III, VI, and X, Fried actually
uses the phrase "deeper understanding" from time to time in stating his objectives. See,
e.g., FaMM 31.
10 He treats, for example, eating, playing a game, making a gift, making restitution,
and acts of love and friendship.
11 There is some evidence that Fried perceives this. This will be taken up in Section
II infra.
12 The phrase "world of values" is my own invention and I intend it only, as convenient shorthand.
13 See, e.g., FRmE 2, 10, 18, 23, 27, 93. Thus, it would seem the book is addressed to Joe
Doakes. But sometimes Fried narrows his addressees down to his "readers." See, e.g., id. at
111.
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reader has to dig it out of various parts of the essay, and this is an
arduous and formidable task in itself. 14 Moreover, readers of this article must be warned that, once Fried's "system" is thus unearthed, it
will still not be instantly intelligible to all.
The possible kinds of particular objects of value in Fried's scheme
are almost limitless, and include persons, being certain kinds of persons, relationships with persons, actions, feelings, thoughts, perceptions,
social institutions, and so on. He focuses on rationalactions, and his examples of these include courageous acts, loving, befriending, listening
to music, taking in a work of art, trusting, keeping promises, controlling others through law, and so on. 15
For Fried, the particular end-for example, a particular human
action-is the "unit of value"' 6 and also the "significant entity"'17 in
the world of values. But the most fundamental feature of all in the
world of values consists of several "basic categories" of ends to which
the various species of particular ends belong. These basic categories
include what Fried calls the moral, the aesthetic, and the categories of
knowledge, of instinct, and of survival.' It is not clear whether these
categories are mutually exclusive, but it seems they are, so no particular end may fit in more than one. Each category is made up of what
Fried calls a "substance."' 19 Thus, the substance of the moral category
of ends consists of "actions affecting others," 20 and the substance of the
knowledge category consists of "reality." 21 (From all this it follows
that law belongs in the moral category.) 22 The substance within each
category is diverse and heterogeneous. Presumably this substance makes
up part of the anatomy of possible particular ends-what he calls the
"material" part.23 For example, in the aesthetic category, this "material" part includes the color spectrum, the dimensionality, and the
framing relevant to the art of painting. It also includes the various
24
possible sounds and rhythms relevant to the art of music.
Thus, within each basic category are its own species of particular
14

I know.

15 See espedally FmmED chs. II, III, V, VIII.
16 Id. at 36.
17 Id. at 37.
18 Actually Fried shifts terminology from time to time. For example, sometimes he
writes of these categories as if each itself is a kind of ultimate unitary end. See, e.g., id.
89-91. But most of the time he thinks of them as "basic categories of ends."
19 Id.

at 89.

20 Id. at 33, 89.
21 Id. at 89.
22 Id. at 125.
23 Id. at 32.
24 Id.
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ends, each of which breaks down into an "anatomy" that has a "material" part-a substance. Now, what else is to be found within the
"anatomy" of each such particular end? According to Fried, each basic
category of ends also "imposes" its own form of "coherence on significant
substance" 25-on the "material" within the anatomy of particular ends
that fall in each category. All this is supposed to be easiest to see in
the case of the aesthetic category and its particular ends; for example,
26
painting, music, and dance.
It is essential to try to elucidate this "coherence" thus imposed on
"significant substance," for in Fried's scheme this coherence is both
complex and of central significance. The "anatomy" of particular
rational ends is supposedly determined by a "dialectic" between the
"material" and the "formal" 2 7 (coherence-determinative factors). The
formal has to do at least with (1) what material elements are incorporated in the anatomy of the particular end, (2) how many are incorporated, and (3) in what fashion. Thus, in a particular aesthetic end,
the formal aspects of, say, a painting are its draftsmanship, its rendering
of dimensions, its color scheme, and so on. 28 And in the moral category
the formal aspects of the anatomy of a specific moral end such as the
action of making just restitution have to do with the injustice of the
original acquisition, the adequacy of the restitution, and the appropriateness of gestures of apology.29 These formal facets provide what Fried
calls "unification in simplicity of a diversity of elements."3 0 They
"organize" the particular end-the particular action of painting, or of
making restitution. They thus "structure substance"; that is, they
render the substance within the anatomy of particular ends coherent.31
But what the formal facet of the anatomy of particular ends is
is one thing, the phenomena that actually "supply" this formal facet
quite another. In Fried's world of values, each "basic category of
values" is occupied not only by "substance," but also by "formal"
principles at several "levels of generality.1 32 It is the job of principles

within a category to supply the "formal element" in the anatomy of
those particular ends belonging to that category. 33 There may be
several different systems of principles within each basic category. For
25 Id.

at 91.

26 Id. at 33, 90.
27 Id. at 33, 79, 85.
28 Id. at 32-33.
29 Id.

at 31.

80 Id. at 32.
81 See espedally id. at 34-35, 91.

32 1d. at 36-39, 40-41, 71-74, 84, 121-23.
33 Id. chs. II, III.
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example, in the aesthetic category, there is a system governing painting,
a system governing dance, a system governing music, and so forth.3 4
Such systems include "highest" level, "intermediate" level, and
"lowest" level principles.3 5 This is just the way things are (in Fried's
world of values). How do these systems of principles "supply" the
formal element in the anatomy of particular values? Within the aesthetic category, Fried instances the activity of dancing. He says the
"lowest level" principle operative here will be the principle- that specifies the "choreography" for the dance 386 He does not say what the
intermediate level principles might be. But he says the relevant highest
37
level principles include the principles of "elegance and grace." All
these higher level principles supply "coherence," and just because of
their greater generality we should not conclude that they are "any the
38s
less intimately involved in determining the particular end.
To take a second example, one from the basic category of moral
ends, and elaborate it more fully: Acts of love have a formal facet
supplied by principles "at several levels of generality."8 9 Thus, these
acts are formally "structured and ordered" by lowest level principles of
love. Although Fried talks of "the principle of love," he nowhere explicitly formulates it.40 He does seek to elaborate a "conception" of
love. Perhaps this is the "lowest level principle of love." Here are some
of the things he says about the "conception" of love: A lover recognizes
his beloved as an end in itself. Love is free and spontaneous. Love requires mutual recognition of personality. Generosity-a willingness
to give up entitlements-is essential between lover and beloved. The
central notion in love is reciprocity-a mutual sharing of interests.
Lovers abandon self-interest. They contribute to each other freely and
spontaneously. Sexual expression may be incorporated. And lovers do
things together joyfully. These, then, are important facets of love, says
Fried, and they apparently comprise a lowest level "formal". principle
or cluster of principles of love which inform, define, and structure
particular acts of love-particular rational ends. 41
Now, these principles are also part of a system of principles, and
a full account of the so-called "formal" facet of the anatomy of partic34 Id.

at

80-31.

85 Id. chs. II, III.
86 Id. at 28.
87 Id. at 33.
88

Id. at 30.

89 Id. at 24.
40 At first Fried is not sure whether he should write of lowest level principles of love.
See id. at 37. But later he goes in for it. See, e.g., id. at 122.
41

Fried treats love mainly in id.at 77-80. Hegel liked love, too.
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ular rational acts of love requires an account Of the intermediate level
principles and the highest level principles of the system of which principles of love are a part. 42
Principles of love are a part of the system of principles of which
the highest level principle is that of morality. 48 But before we take up
this highest level principle, we must consider whether there are any
relevant intermediate level principles that are significantly related in
some way to principles of love. Fried says there are. Among these is the
principle of justice. 44 Fried offers an account of the principle of justice
drawn largely from works of John Rawls. Among other things, justice
is a principle that everyone is to be treated alike unless different
treatment works out to everyone's advantage. 45 But how is the lowest
level principle of love related to this intermediate level principle of
justice? Here, Fried says many different things. One is that the principle of justice defines the "basic, general structure of relations between
persons showing mutual respect" (whether or not in love). 46 If lovers
are to love, they must show mutual respect which is a "constraint"
imposed by the principle of justice. 47 Elsewhere Fried also suggests that
the principle of justice implies a "valuing of the beloved . . . as a
bearer of human personality," 48 and argues that this is a necessary
condition for love to occur.49
Now, what of the highest-level principle in this category of ends,
namely the principle of morality itself? Fried offers an elaborate specification of this principle which, he says, also derives significantly from
Rawls. 50 At the highest level the principle of morality "is an expression
of the concepts of equality, of impartiality, and of regard for all persons
as ends in themselves." 51 The principle of justice follows from the principle of morality. He adds that the principle of morality "expresses,"
42 Fried says he will show how the highest level principle of morality and the intermediate level principle of justice are "implicated" in acts of love. Id. at 74.
43 A significant part of the essay is concerned with this "system of principles" which
generates principles of justice and love. Indeed his treatment of this topic is the most
fully illustrative account of -the "system" of thought he utilizes. He says: "In the next
chapters I shall discuss one such system of principles, having to do with moral actions
in respect to other persons." Id. at 31.
44 Id. at 76-79.
45 Id. at 61. This is only part of what -justice involves. I do not go into Fried -on
justice, as such, for much of it is,as he says, Rawlsian, and so far unpublished.
46 Id. at 122.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 78.
49 Id. at 77, 84.

50 Id. at 41-44, 72.
51 Id. at 42.
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among others, notions (principles?) of reciprocity, respect, personality,
52

and impartiality.
Fried offers three alternatives to his principle of morality: The
egoist principle according to which the actor simply serves his own
interests; the utilitarian principle; and the principle of perversity.5 3
The way Fried characterizes these, most would not want to hold them.
It should be obvious to readers that whatever may be the case with
other things in Fried's world of values, his "principle of morality" is
not easily thought of as the fruit of a voyage of discovery. Here, he
is, in the main, telling us what he thinks ought to be, not what he
discovers to be. He does not admit as much, but then in this respect
he is in good company. Ontologists have often stocked the world with
things they think ought to be there, all in the guise of what they
purport to find there.
We have seen from two examples, one aesthetic and one moral,
how the "formal" aspects of the anatomy of a particular rational end
are supposedly supplied by systems of principles which also occupy the
relevant basic category of value. But what is meant here by "system"?
Fried really does not give a systematic account of this notion, as we
shall see. Yet he thinks it of great importance to uncover the "systems
of principles" which he says exist. Thus, he says:
It is by exhibiting the relation between particular ends and these
more general principles that the rationality of the ends is shown,
and at the same time this is the process which brings to view the
most significant part of what is hidden to persons who have such
ends. Thus the articulation of the system of principles underlying
our rational ends is the main task for a rational analysis of ends
as such.54
On the other hand, as we have seen, Fried wants to say that the
particular end is the "unit of value" 55 and that the particular end is
the "significant entity." 56 For, he asserts, "[t]he systems of principles
are significant only in that it is these principles that make our ends
what they are" 5 7-- that is, determine the structure of the substance of
which these ends are made up.
It should be added that in Fried's world, the systems of principles
also have roles beyond those they play in relation to the formal facet
52

Id. at 41-45.

53 Id. at 50, 53-54.

54 Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
55 Id. at 36.
56 Id. at 37.
57 Id. (emphasis added).
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of the anatomy of particular ends. Thus, they also come into play to
help us order the relationship between our particular ends. For example, he says:
[W]e can see better how rational principles not only are constitutive
of particular ends but also imply an ordering of ends. For each of
[these] ...principles applies to an infinity of situations, and does
so categorically-that is, whenever a situation of a particular sort
is present, then the principles apply and demand that an end of
a particular sort be chosen. Justice is a constraint applicable to any
institution or practice; fairness is a constraint in any situation of
mutual aid, forbearance, and expectation. Thus the orderings implied by these principles can be quite dense and exigent, though
they are far from being complete-there is still a lot of room
for diverse ends and actions within the framework they establish.
I have shown that it is implicit in the principle of morality that
if a person accepts the principle of morality for one action this
commits him in a special sense to accepting the ordering of all his
other ends. The same arguments hold true for the orderings implicit in justice and fairness-if a man would be a just man or a
fair man, who does a just or a fair act, he must accept -those principles not just as principles for this end or act but as principles
for the ordering of all his ends and actions. 58
Finally, in Fried's world of values, there are not just particular
ends. There is a king of all ends. Fried says that this is the human
"drive for coherence" which makes all "material elements . . . part
of a single, unified system."59 Moreover, he believes that considerable
coherence actually "exists between the discrete ends we pursue." 60
So much for a sketch of Fried's general picture of the world of
values (save for "ends in themselves" to be considered later). 61 Does
this world really correspond to reality? This is a crucial question, for
to the extent Fried errs, then he will not only be wrong about his basic
subject matter, but his errors will also (in all probability) infect the
design of any general procedure he offers for the analysis of the anatomies of particular values.
Whether or not Fried errs is in part an empirical question (though
perhaps not straightforwardly so). But he states that he will not offer
"either logical or empirical proof" in support of his account of the
world of values. And he says he hopes "that the reader will bear that
in mind and thus justify [his] omission of tiresome qualifications and
58

Id. at 73-74.

59 Id.

at 100.

60 Id. at 19.
61 See Section

I infra.
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comments."' 2 Rather than rely on "logical or empirical proof," he says
he hopes to "carry conviction . . . on the basis of the fullness and
coherence of the elaboration and on the basis of the potency of
the theory to illuminate the problems and experiences with which it
deals." 68
But surely the question-"What is the character of the world
of values?"-is itself empirical in part, so that "fullness and coherence"
cannot (logically cannot) do the job of empirical considerations. And
Fried himself is not always true to his own disclaimer, for he sometimes
forgets himself and gives reasons for including certain phenomena in
his world of values.
It is possible on empirical grounds to criticize a "theory" of the
type Fried propounds in a variety of different ways.
A. Errors of Inclusion
Does Fried include in his world of values any phenomena that
are not really there? First, he sees this world as one in which human
beings take aim and act accordingly. Yet the fact is that much of value
that we realize from life we do not aim at directly and specifically.
Indeed, we probably could not attain it if we did. Much of value that
we realize from life is in the nature of "by-products" or hoped for
accompaniments of "ways of life." 64 On this, more later.
Then what of Fried's "basic categories of ends"? Is it appropriate
to include a category of instinctualends? Such "ends" include "hunger,
sex, aggression, maternal love," and the like. 65 To the extent we engage
in these forms of behavior "owing to instinct," so to speak, it does seem
inappropriate to consider them ends, for ends in Fried's own scheme
are phenomena we value and pursue consciously-ratherthan owing to
instinct. Fried is himself aware of this and is admittedly uneasy about
including not only the basic category of "instinctual ends" but also the
basic category of "survival" ends. 66 So, perhaps some basic categories
of ends ought to be omitted.
Fried has more principles in his own ontology than could an entire
priesthood. 67 He has highest level principles, intermediate level principles, particular principles, sets of principles, systems of principles, and
62 FRIED 26-27.
63 Id. at 27.
64 A point well made in a paper Fried admires. See id. at 242; Mabbott, Reason and

Desire, 28 PHILOSOPHY 113, 117 (1953).
65 FRID 91.
68 Id. at 87-88, 91-95.
67 But Fried says he will not try to "prove" that such principles exist. See id. at.47-48 n.
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more. Yet he says very little about what, in his scheme of thought, a
principle is (though he says much about what a principle might do).68
Is it so that there just are certain highest level principles within systems
of principles within the basic categories of ends? It would be nice, for
purposes of system building, if there were. But what, for example, is
the highest level principle within the category of ends he calls "knowledge"? He does not say. And in regard to the category he calls "moral,"
he frequently writes as if there is one highest level principle to which
at least many persons hold, yet on examination it turns out that this
single highest level principle consists really of a whole cluster of principles. 69 Moreover, Fried is forced to recognize that in the "moral"
category-the category consisting of ends affecting others-there are
several possibly inconsistent highest level principles, including "egoist"
principles7 0 as well as altruistic ones.
Equally serious, Fried's "lowest level" principles very often turn
out not to be principles at all. Here are some of the things he often calls
lowest level principles: rules of games; plans or strategies for games or
for military action; blueprints for works of art and architecture; composers' scores for pieces of music; theorems of mathematics; choreographies for dances; directions for assembling machines; and even arguments and legal rules.71 Small wonder Fried has so many principles in
his ontology. This varied reality turns out to be particularly unfortunate, for it signifies that Fried cannot have the systematic elegance he
strives for. It is possible to have systems of principles, but not systems
of plans, or systems of scores, or systems of choreographies.
B. Errors of Exclusion
Fried omits much that is prominent in at least our own present-day
world of values. Thus, he does not treat ideals as such. Insofar as they
enter his analysis they ride in on the backs of certain principles he introduces.7 2 Moreover, these principles, even the highest level ones, are
conceived of as formal principles. Yet men-many men-live by ideals,
personal and social, and they conceive of these as substantive in charac68 Nor does he clarify the criteria he uses for classifying principles as higher, intermediate, and lower.
69 See FiEun ch. IV.
70 Id. at 53-54.
71 See id. chs. II, III. Yet elsewhere Fried is critical of what he calls reductionism.
Id. at 105. On reductionism as a source of error in legal philosophy, see EssAYs IN LEGAL
PHILOsOPHY 10-11 (R. Summers ed. 1968).
72 Justice is an example. See FRIED ch. IV. Occasionally, Fried explicitly utilizes the
notion of an ideal, but this is only incidental, and sometimes by way of afterthought
at that. See, e.g., id. at 232.
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ter. Certainly the personal ideal of "being considerate of others" is
substantive. So, too, the social ideals of liberty and economic justice.
Instead, Fried champions particular ends. These "define us at every moment of our lives, indeed

. . .

we are our ends." 73 But surely by this

kind of criterion we ought to recognize an independent place for ideals,
too, for it is appropriate to say that men fight and die for ideals (though
not for particular ends of the moment). Moreover, by the criterion of
coherence (or relevance to coherence) ideals should be included, too,
74
for men organize their lives around them.

The concept of "ways of life" does not as such figure in Fried's
world. Yet persons do in fact pursue different ways of life75 occupationally, geographically (e.g., urban versus suburban), in terms of world
view (e.g., secular versus religious), and so on. Indeed, the ways of life
persons pursue tell us as much about them (if not more) than the particular ends they happen to be pursuing at the time. Furthermore, ways
of life lend coherence to what we do and value.
Within the class of particular ends, Fried is preoccupied with
rational actions as actual or possible ends. To the extent he recognizes
the existence of actual or possible forbearances within the world of
values, this is largely coincidence. Yet much of moral life (an important
facet of the world of values in Fried's own scheme) consists not of positive actions of one sort or another, but of forbearances. This is not
merely a linguistic point. It is true that many forbearances can just as
well be represented as actions; for example, refraining from lying may
be represented as telling the truth, and refraining from promise-breaking may be represented as performing promises. But even so, much is
left for the category of true forbearances; for example, refraining from
forms of covetousness such as theft and rape and refraining from interfering with advantageous relationships that others have. Perhaps one
reason for Fried's neglect of this important facet of our value world is
that he generally neglects the "bad" in this study, and in the realm of
forbearance we refrain mainly from the bad. The only place in his work
where he takes account of forbearances in any sustained fashion is to73 Id. at 37. But what on earth can this mean? One is reminded of Proudhon's remark
that property is theft. Even if patently false, it is still a way of making a point.
74 Fried is not explicit about the ontological criteria he uses, but the two mentioned
in the text-"what defines us" and "coherence-determinativeness"-seem to be the only
ones, and they would both require that independent status be accorded to ideals. For an
illustrative account that accords such status to ideals, see Findlay, The Structure of the
Kingdom of Ends, 43 PROC. BrT. ACAD. 97, 105-08 (1957).
75 For a helpful recent account, see P. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 151-58. Less helpful
is Summers, Professor Fuller on Morality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 4-5 (1965). At one
point, Fried uses the phrase "way of life" but it is quite incidental. See FiuRm 121.
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wards the end where he treats forbearances from taking unreasonable
risks (a relatively narrow sub-class).
C. Errors of Mis-Relationship
To the extent a thinker fails to get the relationships between the
phenomena within his scheme "straight," he also errs in a significant
way. First, Fried thinks the relationship between the constituent elements within any particular rational end is aptly represented as a kind
of "dialectic between the material and the formal." 76 Here, he seems
preoccupied with the aesthetic category (and with Hegel). It may be
that the artist consciously "incorporate[s] the material limits of his
work into his formal structures.1 77 But this jargon does not felicitously
apply to a wide range of other sub-classes of rational ends. It does not
apply to forbearances. And it does not apply to wide varieties of actions
that may count as ends, too. Indeed, consider examples obvious to the
lawyer interested in moral theory. A man has entered a well-drawn
contract. Now, when he performs it, is there a kind of "dialectic between the material and the formal"? No. The promisor is not free to
create in the way the artist is. Rather, he must perform according to the
contract, as specified. True, he has to put "materials" together to perform the contract, but this is at best only remotely analogous to the
work of the artist who "incorporate[s] the material limits of his work
into his formal structures." Contract performers are not artists; they
are "bound" to contract specifications. Artists are free to create, more
or less.
Of course, before two phenomena can "have relationships" there
must first be two phenomena. Can the anatomy of particular rational
ends be divided up into "formal" and "material" elements in the first
place? Fried gives examples, and again, his aesthetic ones are most
plausible. One can envision an artist working with art forms (the
"formal") and a brush, colors, and a canvas (the "material"). But how
are we to draw this distinction outside aesthetic contexts where the
familiar notion of an art form is inapplicable? Fried asserts, for example, that in the action of making just restitution for some valuable
thing, the "formal" facets have to do with the injustice of the original
acquisition, the adequacy of the restitution, and the appropriatenessof
gestures of apology. But Fried does not tell us how such considerations
of justice, adequacy, and appropriateness are "formal." Certainly they
are not art forms. Fried does say they help "determine" the structure
76 Fxum 33.
77 Id. (footnote omitted).
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of the particular act of restitution. But so, too, do considerations of time
and place, and the physical capabilities of the actor, and so on. Are
these phenomena formal as well? If so, what is left for the "material"?
No doubt for the sake of preserving the comprehensiveness of Fried's
general theory it would be nice if we could divide all particular rational
ends into "anatomies," each of which includes formal and material elements. But Fried himself does not articulate generic criteria for doing
so, and in many of his specific examples the way he draws the distinction
seems arbitrary. It would be possible to say that what is formal within
the anatomy of a particular value consists of that which is supplied by
formal principle. But this would only transform the analytical problem
into one in which the difficulty would be that of deciding how to distinguish formal from material principles. Moreover, it is interesting
that Fried does not seem to be able to decide whether or in what sense
principles of morality (which are of great importance in his scheme)
are formal or are material. Thus, at one point Fried says "the principle
of morality is formal." At another he says "morality" is a "substantive"
end.78 This, at the very least, is somewhat mystifying.
What are the relationships between Fried's various principles
(at all levels), on the one hand, and the particular rational ends that
they are supposed to "structure," on the other? He usually proceeds as
if there were only one relation here-that of structuring to structure.
Whatever this relation involves, it is plain that for Fried there are
still further functional relations between principles and ends. Thus,
he says pursuit of certain ends depends upon commitment to certain
principles.7 9 This would be a second kind of relationship beyond the
"structuring" one. For example, he says for a person to be a friend
he must accept Fried's principle of morality.80 It is not possible (logically?) to be a friend without this. A third kind of relationship between
principles and ends is this: Principles are supposed to offer some practical guidance with respect to the choices we ought to make.8 1 Thus,
it will not do for Fried to proceed generally as if his principles merely
structure particular ends (if in fact they do). Instead, he subsumes,
without ever conceding as much, a wide variety of supposed "relationships" under this heading.
A further "relationship" question is this: What are the relationships between the various levels of principles that Fried stresses so
78 See id. at 84, 68.
79 Id. at 77.
80 Id. at 84.
81 Id. at 73-74.
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emphatically? There are at least several possibilities including: the
relationship of instance to generalization, the consistency of interrelationship, and the deduction of one from another. But Fried is
obscure, partly because he does not settle on any of these but vacillates
between them. He offers at least three different accounts of the relationship, each of which is quite different in character, yet he proceeds
as if they were identical. The three are as follows:
(1) Indeed in a formal sense the process of accounting for a particular instance is generally that of finding some more general
rule or principle of which it is an instance. What else can the
process of accounting for the principle consist8 of
than referring
2
that principle to some more general concept?
(2) My thesis is, however, that such deeper and more general principles do -exist, and that the coherence of the more specific
principles and plans of particular rational ends is a function 8of3
their consistency with these deeper, more general principles.
(3) Neither Rawls's principle of right nor my principle of morality
is meant to apply directly; rather both are intended to generate further more particular principles. In the scheme of this
work, the principle of morality is the most general principle
for transactions. From it are derived more specific principles,
until finally we arrive at the rational principle for a particular
end or action.8 4
The first of the foregoing suggests a relationship of instance to
generalization, as in some forms of scientific induction. The second
suggests merely a relationship of consistency. The third suggests a relationship of "following." The first is obviously different from the
latter two. But the latter two are themselves quite different as well.
It is one thing for a principle to be consistent with another principle
and quite another for it to follow from it. Thus, the principle "act in
accord with one's own self interest" and the principle "keep one's
promises" may be consistent with each other (depending on the circumstances), but the latter hardly follows from the former.
D.

The Ultimate Error
In Fried's Kingdom of Ends, the End of Coherence is King.

5

This

must mean that very strange people inhabit Fried's kingdom. For what
these people value seems far less valuable than what men as we know
them actually value. Men as we know them value goodness first and
82
8?
84
85

Id. at
Id.. at
Id. at
Id. at

28.
So.,.

72.
4, 60, 100.
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foremost (although they may sometimes entertain perverse notions of

what is good). They are interested mainly in those features of the
"anatomy of particular ends" which lend value to those ends. They are
interested in those features of particular systems or orderings of ends
which to these persons lend value to such ends. Now, no doubt coherence is a part of this, but so, too, is goodness, and a much larger
part, at that.s6 In short, the valuing beings who inhabit Fried's world
and thus strive mainly for coherence are a most peculiar species. Possibly they are not even persons.
Fried seems uneasily aware of this possibility. On the second page
of his essay, he says:
As I will consider ends in respect to notions like love, friendship,
trust, knowledge, beauty, life and death, as well as in respect to
institutional notions like justice, society, and law, I am quite clear
that much-most, perhaps--of what makes these ends most vivid
and crucial to us will escape this statement and analysis. But this
too is a gain for understanding and appreciation, since these most
elusive aspects of significant ends are at least picked out negatively;
they are the unstated residuum which defies analysis, or at least has
defied my analysis.8 7
But the foregoing can be interpreted, too, to mean that Fried does
not realize that it is goodness he leaves out of account. Indeed, some
of his later remarks suggest as much, for he says, among other things:
For in all such ends, and in the system of these ends, the elements
which are not susceptible to an analysis in terms of consistency
with more general principles are as important as those which are
susceptible to such an analysis. I shall call such elements material
elements. Consider again the example of a formal proof. The
canons of logical consistency supply the formal, what I have called
the rational, element in the ordering. But what of the primitive
terms in the proof, the definitions and premises? These, by hypothesis, are not derived from more general principles. They are given;
they are a starting point. Roughly and loosely, the problem one
wants to solve-where solution means consistency with general formal principles-is not set by general principles. It is the material
element. This is perhaps clearer in the cases of music, poetry, art,
and games. In each of these there are various levels of material ele86 It is not my own view, nor is it Fried's, that particular persons actually value only
what is good. They may also value what is bad. They might even value phenomena that
are neither good nor bad. Indeed, value has been defined by some thinkers as "any
object of any interest." See, e.g., R. PERRY, GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE ch. V (1926). But
it is my own view, as indicated in the text, that it is goodness (rather than coherence)
that makes most things valuable (either instrumentally or intrinsically so) to most persons
who value these things.
87 FRiED 2.
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ments, of givens. In painting they may be the facts of color, shape,
two dimensionality....
...In this essay I have been seeking to unpack the internal
structure of those ends and values and thus to show if possible why
a particular value requires that it be assigned a certain weight.88
Of course, it is difficult for anyone in a work in value theory to
leave goodness out of account. And despite the emphasis on coherence,
on consistency, on structure, on order, and on form, it fortunately
creeps into the analysis.
Finally, it should be noted that those peculiar persons in Fried's
value world also make lots of conscious choices. They even choose
whether to be moral persons-whether generally to do good and avoid
evil.89 They thereby differ from humans familiar to us. These familiar
types are "socialized"-imost of them-generally to behave morally.
They do not decide to behave that way.9 0

II
FRIED'S PROCEDURE FOR ANALYZING THE
ANATOMY OF PARTICULAR

VALUES

Fried says he wants to make the ends men pursue more "perspicuous" to those who pursue or might pursue them.91 He gives specific
analyses of the anatomy of a variety of particular ends. He gives some
analyses of relationshipsbetween ends. He is explicit at least about what
a full analysis of the former kind might look like. Thus, a full analysis
of the anatomy of a particular rational end would involve the following:
(1) an anatomization of that end into basic elements, "material"
and "formal";
(2) an account of the "lowest level" rational principle that contributes to the formal element in the end;
88 Id. at 32, 96. Surely goodness lends weight. This remark quoted in the text (and

others) also help show that Fried thinks he is concerning himself not only with anatomy
but also with physiology.
It is appropriate to add that, of necessity, many criticisms in an article format must
be suggestive in character rather than fully worked out. This is preeminently so of my
criticism that goodness rather than coherence must be of primary significance in any
satisfactory value theory. Obviously, it is not possible to work out an affirmative general
theory of goodness here. A book (at least) would be necessary. And, at that, it would have
to be tentative in nature.
89 Id. at 55-57.
00 See Mabbott, supra note 64, at 121.
91 FrED 1.
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(3) an account of higher level principles that also contribute,
albeit indirectly, to this formal element; and
(4) an account of the systematic character of the relationship between the relevant lowest level principle and the system of
higher principles of which it is a part.
But to give examples of particular analyses and to set forth explicitly
what a full analysis would look like are not at all identical with setting
forth a procedure for the fruitful analysis of the anatomy of particular
values. Although Fried alludes to the existence of an analytical procedure
from time to time, he does not directly confront the task of constructing
one. This is disappointing, for he is generally aware of the inevitably
illustrative character of much of his effort. 2 Indeed, he acknowledges
that he gives only one more or less fully worked out illustration of the
relationships between principles at various levels within a basic category, namely, those involving morality, justice, and love, all within the
category of morality. 3 Yet despite this awareness he does not seek
rigorously to develop a procedure for analyzing the anatomy of values
which persons might go on to utilize on their own in contexts beyond
his illustrations.
This is not to say he says nothing of procedure. Fried certainly
proceeds as if a procedure exists. Indeed, he states: "I assert that there
is a procedure for analyzing ends which illuminates the end or value,
qua end or value, for a person holding it."94 Now, to what is this
procedure to be applied? Fried is ambivalent. Sometimes he proceeds
as if the question were: How is the anatomy of particular possible
objects of value to be analyzed? At other times, he proceeds as if the
question were: How is the anatomy of a particular value that a particular person actually has pursued or is now pursuing to be analyzed?
Yet these are quite different (though not unrelated) questions, and the
second requires a "fuller" procedure that also sets forth how we are to
determine what end the actor has pursued or is actually pursuing. Fried
struggles to formulate the criterion that this fuller procedure supposedly
includes for determining what principles are the principles of the agent.
He envisions an interlocutor stopping the actor and interrogating him
about what his principles are. He thinks the actor will "acknowledge"
the applicable principle when the interlocutor presents it to the actor
as one among several alternatives. 5 (This in itself is supposed to be
92

See, e.g., id. at 31.

93 Id. at 31, 74, 115.

94 Id. at 23.
95

Id. at 17, 22-25.
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illuminating to the actor who has been interrupted, for he is supposed
then to see more clearly what he has been trying to do all along.)96
But Fried sees many difficulties with all this, and it is not clear that
he ultimately ends up with the required criterion (or with an answer
to the question: How is the interlocutor to know what alternatives to
pose?). One difficulty he does not squarely confront is that his scheme
presupposes pre-existing principles. But is it valid to assume that these
principles always pre-exist, however implicit or inchoate they may be?
The remaining features of a procedure for analyzing the anatomy
of particular rational ends would be equally applicable to the analysis
of either rational ends actually being pursued by a person or rational
ends that might possibly be pursued. Let us assume our concern is with
possible ends. First, we are to divide the possible particular end up into
its "material" and "formal" elements. 97 But how? Fried does not say.
He does not even articulate generic criteria for drawing this distinction.
And we have already seen that difficulties arise in applying the distinction outside the world of aesthetics and art forms. 98
Second, we are to identify and "unpack" the various levels of
principles that "govern" the formal element in the particular end.
But how? Here Fried does offer something explicit. He says: "[T]he
procedure of formulating rational principles might be taken as similar
to the method of Socrates."9' 9 And he alludes to "the general conceptions
of courage, or wisdom, or justice which Socrates elicits from his interlocutors."' 10 0 But Socrates used no one method,101 and the methods
Socrates used are not precisely relevant anyway. His concerns were not
the same as Fried's. Socrates wanted to "unpack" courage, yes, but
not with an eye to showing how, as Fried might say, it "structures the
internal complexities within the anatomy of particular acts of courage."
Furthermore, Socrates's methods are difficult to characterize and apply,
02
as Fried himself seems to concede.

Third, we are to show that various levels of principles "intimately
involved in determining the particular end' 0 3 are systematically inter96 Id. at 2-3, 31.
97 Id. at 32.
98 Text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
99 FmRE 23. See also id. at 111.
100 Id. at 23.
101 Important differences in the methods of "Socrates" have often been noticed. See,
e.g., G. R.YLE, PLATO's PROGRESS 119-23 (1966).
102 FS M 22.
103 Id. at 30.
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related. But how? Fried does not say. He does not even settle on a
consistent overall account of what the nature of this systematic interrelation is supposed to be. 10 4
Thus, it turns out that although Fried may think he offers a
general procedure for analyzing what he calls the anatomy of particular
values, he does not do so. Had he done so, it would then have been
useful to consider how a proferred procedure of this sort might be
evaluated. We have already stressed that because of Fried's view of the
world of values in which coherence reigns supreme (in place of goodness) 6 5 any procedure he might offer would inevitably analyze coherence
and not goodness, as such. Thus it would fail to capture what it is about
particular objects of value (as viewed by persons) that makes them most
valuable to most persons. But such a procedure might be deficient in
still other ways, too. And in the final analysis, it would be important
to consider whether any such general procedure for the analysis of all
rational ends could be rigorously developed.
Finally, a procedure for giving an account is not identical with
a standard or standards for judging the correctness of accounts. A
thorough study would have to confront the problem of standards, too.
From time to time, Fried offers this as a test: Does the procedure
provide accounts that are illuminating for "the reader"?' 1 6 It is submitted that this is a non-standard.
III
FRiED ON MEANS, ENDS, AND INTRINSIC VALUE

In addition to offering a general picture of the world of values
and some suggestions for analyzing the specific anatomies of particular
values (all with accompanying illustrative analysis and examples), Fried
is also out to slay a few dragons. Of these, the most important is the
notion that all rational human activity takes the form of striving, via
some means, to achieve some separable end state, distinct from these
means, which is itself the ultimate object of value. 10 7 A dose corollary
of this notion is the thesis that all such striving can therefore have only
instrumental value, not intrinsic value. 08 Fried believes that both the
foregoing notion and its corollary thesis are false. And from their
104 P. 611

supra.

105 See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
106 FRtED 23, 47-48 n.
107 Id. at 9.
108 Id.
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falsity, it seems to follow "that there is a multiplicity of ultimate ends,
things valued for their own sake, and not just as instruments to the
attainment of some other end." 10 9 Fried suggests that bringing us to
view things in this way will redress an important imbalance. 1 0
Fried gives a wide variety of examples of particular pursuits in
which it is not, in his view, possible to differentiate between a "means,"
on the one hand, and a separable and distinct "end-state," supposedly
the ultimate value, on the other. Thus, a dance is not to be thought of
as so many steps taken in accord with a given pattern so as to achieve a
separate and distinct end called the dance. The dance just is these
patterned steps.' Acts of love are not to be thought of as means to
112
some separable and distinct end state called love. Love just is loving.
No further end state can be adduced as determining loving in the way
that, say, the end of securing nourishment determines the aptness of
eating certain foods to that end.
Still, Fried recognizes that even if the acts of dancing and the
dance, and the acts of loving and love are inseparable, dancing and
loving might nonetheless only have instrumental value, for the agent
might not think of himself as engaging in them at all "for their own
sake," but rather for some further, higher purpose. He might be dancing to improve his health, or loving to discharge certain religious
obligations. To have intrinsic value in Fried's scheme, the agent must
consciously pursue the end at least partially "for its own sake." 1 3 And
Fried thinks humans do often pursue ends for their own sake, or partly
for their own sake. He thinks we can see most "clearly" how this can
be if we recognize the very considerable internal complexity displayed
14
in the anatomies of even the seemingly simplest ends.
Fried is at great pains to stress the inner complexities of the
"anatomies" of seemingly simple ends. He considers eating: 1 5 Eating
is an action. Eating can be not just a complex end, but an exceedingly
complex end. Consider eating at a historic state occasion. This eating
may be broken down into several elements; for example, sight and
smell of food, handling and cutting it, biting, chewing, and swallowing,
and also special memories or beliefs associated with the occasion, and
so forth. Thus, eating can be complex in the sense that it includes
'09 Id.

at 10.

110 Id. at 10, 12.
Il1 Id. at 28.
112

Id. at 77-80.

113 Id. at 28.
114 Id. at 10.
115 Id. at 11-12
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several elements, complex in the sense that these are elements of different sorts (e.g., nonmental and mental), complex in that the elements
are "arranged in a particular, only partially variable order,"'116 and
complex in that the rhythm and spacing in time as well as the sequence
in time of the elements is important to the realization of the end.
In stressing the internal complexities of the anatomies of particular
ends, Fried is really trying to kill two birds with one stone (although
he is less than explicit about this). As we saw in the first section of this
article, he wants to break the anatomy of particular ends down into
various parts in order to show how "coherence-determinative" factors
are at work, for he thinks this will enlighten persons who pursue or
might pursue these ends." 7 However, he thinks that if we break down
the anatomy of certain particular ends into various elements of a complex whole, this will enable us to see more "clearly" how these ends can
be valued for their own sake."18 Here he seems to be assuming that it
is easier for us to understand how an agent might value something
for its own sake if it is something complex rather than simple.
Actually, this is a dubious assumption and probably reflects the preoccupation of academic minds with the "complex and difficult." For,
as poets tell us, even the simplest things in life are objects of great
value. It might be that some of the simplest things really turn out to be
complex, but this remains irrelevant to whether they can be valued
"for their own sake." At times, Fried even seems to require that the end
be a significantly complex one before it can be valued for its own sake.
Fried does not offer an extended analysis of the key phrase "valued
for its own sake," a notion that serves as his prime criterion of intrinsic
value. 1 9 Nor does he consider the psychological sources of difficulty in
applying the distinction between valuing something instrumentally and
valuing it for its own sake. Doubtless when human beings act they
seldom think consciously in terms of this distinction. And when they
do, they may (erroneously?) think of what they are doing as a means
to some separate end state. (Indeed, this is something Fried wants to rail
against.) Possibly, Fried or some other interlocutor might be on hand
to straighten such persons out and make them realize that they were
116 Id. at 13.
117 Text accompanying notes 9-31 supra.
118 FRE D 10.
119 It may be that the fact we do value some things "for their own sake" (if we do)

does not enable us to distinguish between instrumental value and intrinsic value, a

possibility Fried does not consider. Indeed, Fried generally refrains from taking sides in
the philosophical controversies over the tenability of this distinction. (Actually, more than
one possible distinction may be involved.)
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really pursuing something for its own sake (at least partly). But if this
is to be a possibility, how can it be a requirement (as it is in Fried's own
scheme) that in order for a particular end to have intrinsic value the
agent himself must think of himself as pursuing that end at least partly
for its own sake?
Fried offers many examples of ends that can have intrinsic value
(can be "ends in themselves"), depending on the psychological states of
the agent, for he wants to stress their ubiquity. Indeed the following
phrases are among the most commonly used in the entire essay: "end
in itself,"1 20 "ends in themselves," "intrinsic value," and so on. It is
therefore puzzling to find him opening his otherwise illuminating and
lengthy account of the "concept" of privacy with the remark that we
2
value privacy highly but that it cannot be or is not an end in itself.' '
Precisely why it cannot, he never says. He seems to think it only a
"(rational context" within which other ends such as love may be realized.
Yet there is no reason why one could not value privacy for its own sake,
by Fried's own criteria. Some forms of privacy are indeed "complex,"
and the notion that a person might, for example, "want to be alone" in
some places and in some circumstances just for the sake of being alone
is at least intelligible.
Fried equates "end" with "value," and "intrinsically valuable"
with "end in itself."' 1 22 But he does not address himself to the fact that
what may be intrinsically valuable to a particular person may, objectively speaking, be either a positive good, or something bad. Certainly
a person could pursue something bad for its own sake. It seems, at least
generally, that when he uses the phrase "intrinsic value" or the phrase
"end in itself" he has in mind something that he considers a positive
good. 123 Thus, for him it is one of the very highest goods for men to
treat other men as ends in themselves and not as means to their own
ends. 124 This way of thinking may tempt one to think that all men are
ends in themselves-have intrinsic value-are intrinsically good. But
so far as we humans can know, at least some men appear rotten to the
core.
Moreover, any "intrinsic value" thesis that equates value with
120 The terminology "end in itself" is likely to be misleading. It is odd that Fried
adopted it, for it suggests (to some) that ends may be divorced from their means of
realization, a point Fried wants to deny, at least for some ends. See p. 617 supra. For
reasons Fried would likely endorse, John Dewey once urged that "end-in-itself" is a
"self-contradictory term." J. DEwEY, THEoRY OF VALUATiON 40-43 (1939).
121 FRIED 137-38.
122 Id. at 11, 137.
12 See, e.g., id. at 77, 117-18.
124

See id. at ch. IV, 244.
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goodness encounters at least two further problems. First, what has intrinsic value (goodness) may lose this value if pursued to excess. Courage may turn into foolhardiness, generosity into lavishness, and so on. 12 5
Second, it will always be possible to fill out descriptions of actions that
are generally "good in themselves" but which in the circumstances are
actually bad. An example is telling the truth but thereby giving away
an important state secret.
Finally, Fried, as we saw, hopes that via his analysis an "important
balance may be redressed"-that we will be "brought to see that there
is a multiplicity of ultimate ends, things valued for their own sakes,
and not just as instruments to the attainment of some other end."' 2
Yet his analysis does not bring us to see this. At most, his analysis
brings us to see the possibility that our world might include many
things valued for their own sakes. For it would be consistent with
Fried's own analysis of intrinsic value for all the agents in the world
at a given time to view almost everything that they undertook to do as
done for some further purpose, and thus to have only instrumental
value.
IV
THE PLACE OF LAW IN FRIED'S SCHEME
Law comes in for a brief treatment. As part of his overall effort,
Fried says he wants to provide a "conceptual structure to bridge a
theory of individual ends and a theory of social institutions ...."127 He

thinks of "property, the law, and bureaucracies, mechanisms like the
market, systems of roles like professions or social class" all as social
128
institutions.
But it turns out that he is most concerned with trying to establish
the point that these social institutions not only have instrumental value,
but are also "ends in themselves," and therefore have intrinsic value.
"[L]arge parts of the social system are necessarily ends in themselves."'129
Thus, legal institutions such as marriage, criminal procedure, and a
legal profession are ends in themselves. To the extent marriage is an
end in itself, so too is its legal facet, for its legal facet helps define and
125 A widely recognized point. See. e.g.. A. MAcINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY Op ETHIcs

65-66 (1966).
128 FRIED 10.

127 Id. at 106 n.
128 Id. at 114.
129 Id. at 105.
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express the nature of marriage itself. It is argued that the institutional
aspect of being married is an end in itself in that it shapes the underlying relationships that have "intrinsic value, as for instance relations
of love."'130 Criminal procedure, too, is partly an end in itself-an end
having intrinsic value, because, for example, it defines and expresses
such ends in themselves as (1) the system of constraints that assures that
the innocent are not convicted and condemned, and (2) the adversary
system of trial that expresses the moral equality between accuser and
accused which is thus an end in itself. 131 A legal profession is an end
in itself in the sense that certain professional roles-for example, defending unpopular causes-are expressive of such ends in themselves
as justice. Thus, the lawyer defends the unpopular cause "because
justice requires" this, and justice is an end in itself. More generally,
the whole legal profession is "systematically bound to certain aspects of
justice." 3 2
Fried tries to show how legal actions, and relations, being ends or
sets of ends, fit into some basic category of ends. Thus, he says law belongs to the category of ends involving actions that affect others-the
moral category. 3 3 The highest level principle relevant to the determination of actions and relations having legal facets, then, is the principle
of morality. An example of an action with a legal facet would be that
of paying one's taxes. 134 This action has an internal complexity. But
a full analysis of its character requires (1) an account of the lowest level
rational principle that defines and determines this action, (2) an account
of the bearing of any relevant intermediate level principles, and (3) an
account of the bearing of the highest level principle-that of morality.
Now the lowest principle here, according to Fried, would be a legal
rule imposing the tax. Intermediate level principles of relevance indude the principle of justice. Thus, the constraints of justice are expressed through law. Fried sums up: "[T]he function of concretizing
the constraints of justice is the most characteristic function of law."' 1 5
Presumably, in the taxation example, justice specifies, among other
things, equality of tax burden. Ultimately, we arrive at the relevant
highest level principle at work here, the principle of morality, which,
as we have already suggested, generates the principle of justice (among
other principles). For Fried, the foregoing schema reveals a "mode for
130 Id.
'131 Id.
132 Id.

at 117-21.
at 125-32.
at 132-35.

133 Id. at 125 n.
184 Id. at 124-25.

135 Id. at 122.
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evaluating" social institutions, such as law, which is "appropriate to
their nature."'13 6
Fried's main thesis about law in society is a valid and neglected
one. Law is not necessarily merely instrumental in character. Certainly
some laws, legal institutions, and legal processes may themselves have
their own independent significance quite apart from the particular ultimate uses to which they are put. 3 7 Take legal processes as an example:
Quite apart from the outcomes, decisions, and results of these processes,
we may inquire, too, into their own "intrinsic worth." A process for
trying criminal defendants may be designed to incorporate such important "process values" as procedural fairness to the parties and freedom from undue influence on decision makers, both of which are values
not unrelated to the quality of the outcomes of these processes but
which nonetheless have an independent significance of their own in
that failure to observe them is separate ground for criticism even where
the relevant outcomes may be considered sound in substantive terms.
Many other illustrative examples could be cited.
But why shroud this perfectly valid thesis in the terminology of
"ends in themselves," as Fried does? Doubtless he wants comprehensive
symmetry and systems. He buys it at the price of terminological awkwardness and conceptual strain (of his own making). This awkwardness
is most obvious when he concludes that law as such is an "end in itself."'138 And conceptual strain is indeed evident, for earlier in his essay,
Fried conceptualizes those objects of value he labels "ends in themselves" as ones that persons think of themselves as pursuing "for their
own sake."' 13 9 Who on earth thinks of himself as pursuing law, or even
particular facets of law, "for their own sake"?
Notice, too, how lust for comprehensiveness and systematic structure induces Fried to categorize legal rules as "lowest level principles"
within his scheme. The foregoing taxation example is illustrative. The
legal rule (lowest level principle) imposes the duty to pay taxes and
thus "structures or orders" the anatomy of the particular end of paying
one's taxes. Here Fried's anatomical schema has become an idde fixe.
True, there are analogies between what some legal rules are supposed
to do and the various functions of choreographies, game plans, musical
scores, art forms, and the like (all of which Fried ultimately lumps
under the heading of "lower level principles"). Perhaps the analogy
136 Id. at 136.
137 Of course, these could be of independent significance without having "intrinsic
value," a possibility Fried does not take up.
188 FRu
156.
139 Id. at 22-23, 28.

ANATOMY OF VALUES

19711

between legal rules of marriage and non-legal rules of games is the
closest, for both kinds of rules are in some sense constitutive. But
generally speaking, although all rules of games are "constitutive" of the
games they structure, most rules of law are not thus creative and are,
rather, regulative in character. Most rules of law are not institutioncreative, like the rules of marriage or rules of criminal procedure. Most
rules of law govern "already created" forms of human behavior. 140
Finally, Fried is led, it seems, by preoccupation with his own
framework of thought, to see law as structured and ordered by "higher
level" principles of justice which he thinks of as standards for the
criticism of law which are "appropriate to [law's] nature" as a system
of expressive relations-as ends. 141 Aristotle might go for this way of
looking at law (and other things). But, at the very least, if Fried is to say
that law has a true nature, and that part of this nature is to do justice,
then he should also confront the well-known objections to this way of
looking at things, objections that comprise a whole critical tradition
142
centuries old.
CONCLUSION

Although the thrust of this article has been critical, Fried's essay is
not devoid of merit. Important segments are devoted to notions of
morality and justice. 143 I have refrained from giving frontal consideration to these, for Fried acknowledges that they are much influenced
144
by the work, published and unpublished, of John Rawls.
But there is much of merit in Fried's essay that is plainly his. In
the chapter on privacy he demonstrates how privacy is essential to the
pursuit of such important personal and social ends as love, friendship,
and marriage. He shows, too, how unlike our own and how objectionable would be a world in which each of us was subjected to some kind
of electronic monitoring device. Then, too, Fried takes up and treats
in enlightening fashion the seemingly anomalous fact that "we are
prepared to expend far greater resources in saving the lives of known
persons in present peril, than we are prepared to devote to measures
140 On the

well-known distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, see D.
271-73 (1965).

SHwAYDER, Tan STATIFICATION OF BEHAVIOuR

141 FRrm 136.

See, e.g., J.S. MmL, Nature, in TmE EssAYs ON RELION (Greenwood ed. 1969).
ch. IV.
144 See note 3 supra. Not until Rawls's forthcoming book on justice is published will
it be possible to separate Fried from Rawls. At least one should wait before trying.
142

143 E.g., FRIE
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that will avert future dangers to persons, perhaps unknown and not
yet even in existence."1 45
Then, too, although not original with Fried in basic concept, this
essay includes interesting and fruitful developments of the idea of a
"life plan."'146 A person can go seriously wrong in his value pursuits if
he does not understand the constraints they impose and the conflicts
they generate, and plan accordingly. But if he understandingly adopts
a rational "life plan" he can maximize the value of life. One cannot
hope to eliminate all constraints-indeed, if one is to be a just man or
a moral man, this in itself will impose constraints on the ends one may
choose and on how he may pursue them. Nor can one hope to eliminate
all conflicts between the various ends that he might pursue. But through
a life plan one may, among other things, eliminate some conflicts and
arrange to do possibly conflicting things at different times, thereby
minimizing conflicts. Through a life plan one rationally "deploys ends
in time."' 47 Fried also illuminatingly discusses what he calls the "form"
of possible life plans,'14 and various factors that, as he puts it, "shape"
49
particular life plans.1
In sum, I for one want to see more Fried. No doubt other readers
will feel this way, too. But it also seems safe to predict that some future
readers will prefer that he eschew the form of system building that
pervades (and in my view, mars) his essay. One is hard put to identify
a single substantive insight in the essay that clearly derives from his
"system" as such.150
Furthermore, some of his future readers will prefer that he strive
for more clarity. Much of the first two-thirds of his essay proved ex145 FREED 207. This part of the essay, and the part on privacy, have both been published before. Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1415 (1969); Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE

L.J. 475 (1968).

See especially FRE 97-101, ch. X. Fried acknowledges indebtedness to Hegel,
Sartre, and Mabbott. In particular see J. SARTRE, BEINO AND NOTHINGNESS (H. Barnes
transl. 1956). See also Mabbott, supra note 64, at 118-23.
146

147 FRua 157.
148 Id. at 101,

155-69. Fried says he is content in this essay to sketch the rational
structure of a life plan only with respect to how it "orders ends relative to questions of
life and death." Id. at 101.
149 Id. at 169-77.

150 Of course, a given system may have value. But then, too, it may not. And it may
get in the way. Worse than this, it may prove to be an affirmative source of error, rather
than a distinctive source of insight and illumination. For example, at one point after
having set up basic categories of ends to which all particular ends belong, Fried decides
there must be one unitary end or category of end at the very top, and this, he says, is
the End of Coherence. Now surely this is highly questionable, and even more surely,
Fried would not have been led to say it if he had not been afflicted with a case of

symmetrophilia.
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ceedingly difficult to read.151 Perhaps Hegel's influence is partly to
blame. Certainly there are some striking similarities in form and in
style-system building for its own sake, notions of "dialectical" interrelationship, the persistent equating of highly disparate phenomena,
recurrent but subtle shifts in thesis, 152 excesses of profundity, 153 and
continuous repetition of key terminology. 154 Now it is certainly not for
me to say whose work should inspire whom, or whose work another
should emulate (if anyone's). And doubtless Hegel puts forth many
substantive insights. 155 Still, it was no less an admirer of clarity than
John Stuart Mill who, on reading Hegel, complained that:
I found by actual experience of Hegel that conversancy with him
tends to deprave one's intellect. The attempt to unwind an apparently infinite series of self-contradictions not disguised but
openly faced, really, if persisted in, impairs the acquired delicacy
of perception of false reasoning and false thinking which has been
gained by years of careful mental discipline with -terms of real
meaning. For some time after I had finished the book all such words
as reflection, development, evolution &c., gave me a sort of sickening feeling which I have not yet entirely got rid of.156
The chapter on privacy is an exception.
Discussions of this and the preceding three Hegelian attributes of Fried's work
can be found throughout this article. See also HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox ed.
1965).
151
152

153 See, e.g., Fried's statement that "[t]hough there is a dose relation between law

and the concept of justice, there is no simple one-to-one correspondence." FmED 122.
154 See, e.g., Fried's "structuring and ordering," "ends in themselves," "systems of prindples," and so on. Id. passim.
155 Actually, in substantive terms, much of Fried's book is rather more Kantian than
Hegelian. Compare id. chs. TI-IV with I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS (H. Paton ed. 1956).
156 2 THE LE=rERS oF JOHN STUART MILL 93 (H. Elliot ed. 1910) (emphasis in original).

